Curtrina Martin, Individually and as Parent and Next Friend of G. W., a Minor v. United States

1. The law enforcement proviso in §2680(h) overrides only the inten-tional-tort exception in that subsection, not the discretionary-function exception or other exceptions throughout §2680. 2. The Supremacy Clause does not afford the United States a defense in FTCA suits. The FTCA is the “supreme” federal law governing the United States’ tort liability and serves as the exclusive remedy for damages claims arising from federal employees’ official conduct. The statute generally makes the government liable under state law on the same terms as a private individual would be liable under the law of the place where the tortious conduct occurred. Because the FTCA incorporates state law as the liability standard, there is typically no conflict between federal and state law for the Supremacy Clause to resolve. 3. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit should consider whether subsection (a)’s discretionary-function exception bars either the plaintiffs’ negligent- or intentional-tort claims—undertaking that assessment without reference to the mistaken view that the law enforcement proviso applies to subsection (a). The court must then ask of any surviving claims whether, under Georgia state law, a “private individual under like circumstances” would be liable for the acts and omissions the plaintiffs allege, subject to the defenses discussed in §2674—not a Supremacy Clause defense. Vacated and remanded.

Result

Vacated

The case returns to the Eleventh Circuit. That court must decide whether the discretionary-function exception applies to the negligence or intentional-tort claims and whether Georgia law would make a similarly situated private person liable.