Court access for disabled people

1. Whether the Tenth Circuit, in its Order and Judgment in Appendix G, created a conflict with this Court’s authority under the Fourteenth Amendment by affirming the dismissal of a disabled pro se litigant’s civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Violence Against Women Act on waiver and inadequate-briefing grounds, despite the denial of a guardian ad litem under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(2) and reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act, thereby denying meaningful access to the courts in conflict with Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 2. Whether the Tenth Circuit, in its Order and Judgment in Appendix G, created a conflict with this Court’s decision in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), by affirming the district court’s judgment without reaching the merits of well-documented perjury and fraud-on-the-court claims, thereby affirming the denial of any evidentiary hearing on those claims in violation of due process. 3. Whether the Tenth Circuit, in its Order and Judgment in Appendix G, created a conflict with this Court’s authority by affirming the dismissal of the litigants federal civil rights claims on procedural grounds, thereby resulting in indirect permission of Colorado statute to authorize or encourage private discrimination in housing in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and the Fair Housing Act, in a manner that permits the state statute to supersede the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3600, 3604, and 3615, contrary to this Court’s decisions in cases such as Heitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015), and Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).