Court access for poor litigants

1. Whether a state court violates the core notice-pleading guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and flouts this Court’s long-standing precedent in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), by inventing a heightened, pre-discovery evidentiary threshold of "verifiability" to summarily bar an unrepresented, indigent plaintiff from accessing the discovery process. 2. Whether a state appellate court violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by affirming the summary dismissal of an indigent, pro se litigant’s civil action using a fabricated factual narrative that explicitly contradicts the physical text of the record, thereby permanently insulating a trial court's procedural actions from meaningful review. 3. Whether a state court denies an unrepresented, indigent litigant a meaningful opportunity to be heard under the Fourteenth Amendment by strictly enforcing local filing deadlines to deny a request for a continuance to obtain counsel, while simultaneously condoning a multi-defendant procedural ambush by accepting a surprise, substantive memorandum from corporate counsel less than two days before a dispositive hearing. 4. Whether a state appellate court abdicates its core constitutional obligation to provide a meaningful appeal under the Fourteenth Amendment when it uses administrative consolidation to issue a blanket opinion that completely omits a separate corporate defendant from individual analysis, terminating a multi-defendant, ten-count civil action through a single paragraph of analytical silence that fails to dedicate a single sentence of review to nine out of ten fully briefed common-law claims.