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1. Whether the Eleventh Circuit’s dismissal of petitioner’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) claims conflicts with Luis v. Zang, 833 F. 3d 619, 630-634 (CA6 2016), which held that allegations identifying a named third-party remote-monitoring software product and describing its specific real-time functionality are sufficient, without more, to plead contemporaneous interception and survive dismissal (App. 7) and with Epstein v. Epstein, 843 F. 3d 1147, 1150-1152 (CA7 2016), which applied United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F. 3d 701, 703-706 (CA7 2010), and In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F. 3d 9, 21—23 (CA1 2003), which applied United States v. Steiger, 318 F. 3d 1039, 1047-1050 (CA11 2003)—to the extent those decisions establish that an automatic rule-based duplication mechanism satisfies the ECPA’s interception requirement regardless of whether the duplication occurs at the application layer or, as alleged here, at the network layer—such that this Court should resolve the resulting division among the circuits on this recurring question of statutory construction? 2. Whether the Eleventh Circuit erred by relying on University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F. 3d 405, 410 (CA11 1999), to hold that a federal court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying merits is “powerless to continue” and therefore cannot resolve a pending Rule 11 or inherent-authority sanctions matter (App. 8, n. 4), in conflict with this Court’s decisions in Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U. S. 131, 137-138 (1992), and Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U. S. 32, 46-50 (1991), as well as the Eleventh Circuit’s decisions in Eagle Hospital Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F. 3d 1298 (CA11 2009), and Hyde v. Irish, 962 F. 3d 1306 (CA11 2020), which recognize that sanctions proceedings are collateral to the merits and survive a jurisdictional dismissal?