Penalty for going to trial

1. Whether a prosecutor’s practice of overcharging a defendant with an offense which carries an extreme mandatory minimum sentence, which is decades longer than he would otherwise receive, solely with the intent to force a guilty plea to a charge with identical elements but no mandatory minimum, violates the Due Process Clause by presenting a choice so coercive that it functionally obliterates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial? 2. Whether a statutory scheme violates the Due Process Clause when it allows the prosecutor to choose between two identical statutory provisions prohibiting the exact same conduct - one mandating a 25-year minimum prison term and the other imposing no mandatory minimum - and provides no guidelines to constrain the arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of the statute, and empirical evidence shows a practice of prosecutors imposing a multi-decade trial penalty on defendants for asserting innocence? 3. Whether it is a violation of the Due Process Clause and the separation of powers doctrine for a legislature to delegate unbridled and unguided authority to the prosecution to choose between identical offenses that grant the prosecution the power to predetermine the sentence in a case, thereby invading the core judicial function of sentencing?