Disability accommodations in court

1. Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state court to grant a continuance when a disabled litigant explicitly informs the court at the outset of proceedings that she is cognitively impaired by medically-necessary medication and cannot meaningfully participate in the hearing — particularly where the court’s own scheduling decision precipitated the medical crisis requiring the medication. 2. Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U. S. C. §12132, as interpreted by this Court in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509 (2004), requires state courts to provide reasonable accommodations — including brief continuances — when a disabled litigant’s disability-related medical treatment prevents meaningful participation in judicial proceedings. 3. Whether due process is violated when a state court’s official transcript omits a litigant’s opening statement containing explicit notice of disability-related impairment and requests for accommodation — thereby preventing meaningful appellate review of constitutional claims and insulating judicial conduct from scrutiny. 4. Whether due process is violated when a state appellate court remands a case to the same trial judge who committed statutory and constitutional violations against the litigant, rather than assigning a different judge, where the probability of bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable under Rippo v. Baker, 580 U. S. (2017), and Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. 868 (2009). 5. Whether a trial court violates due process when it limits evidence to post-final order events without prior notice, thereby preventing a litigant from presenting relevant evidence of ongoing stalking patterns and protective order violations.