Fairness in child support hearings

1. Whether the federal Title IV-D incentive payment structure (42 U.S.C. § 658a; 45 C.F.R. Part 305), when administered through state contracts with publicly traded private corporations operating state child support disbursement units, creates a structural pecuniary interest in case outcomes that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), and Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016)? 2. Whether federal law preempts state-court income execution against Veterans Affairs disability compensation benefits when the United States Department of Veterans Affairs is concurrently apportioning a portion of those same benefits to the same dependents pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5307 and 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.450 and 3.451, and whether such double collection exceeds the limits set by Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619 (1987)? 3. Whether absolute judicial immunity under Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), extends to a state actor whom the State itself classifies as a civil service employee under N.Y. Civil Service Law § 62—having accepted a “Statement in Lieu of Oath” rather than the constitutional oath of judicial office required of judicial officers under N.Y. Const. Art. XIII § 1—or whether the threshold determination of judicial-officer status under Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), turns on the actor’s classification under state law rather than the title borne by the office? 4. Whether a state actor enforcing a child support obligation in violation of the continuing exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666, acts “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction” within the meaning of Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991), such that absolute judicial immunity does not attach?